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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOLAR SALT COMPANY, \ 
a corporation, I 
Plaintiff-Appellant, J 
vs# v Case No. 
I 14427 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION I 
COMPANY, a corporation, j 
;
 Defendant-Respondent. J 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in which Solar Salt Company (hereinafter 
"Solar"), seeks damages and injunctive relief against Southern 
Pacific Transportation Company (hereinafter "Southern Pacific"), 
for changes in salt content and lake elevation in the Great Salt Lake, 
allegedly resulting from Southern Pacific's construction of a cause-
way across the Great Salt Lake. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Based upon the pleadings, memoranda, other documents on file 
and the arguments of counsel, the lower Court, the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson, Sr., presiding, granted Southern Pacific's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, dismissing Solar's Complaint with prejudice.1 
(R. 99,100.) 
1
 Solar did not assert to the Court the Second Cause of Action of its Complaint, which was 
based upon a third-party beneficiary theory, and in effect, stipulated that that cause of action 
was without merit. (R. 88.) 
l 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant does not enunciate in its brief the relief which it seeks 
on appeal to this Court, but presumably, appellant seeks to have the 
judgment of the District Court reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS >* 
While the factual statement in Solar's brief may be accepted as 
correct for the purpose of this appeal, its statement of facts is frag-
mentary; partially irrelevant and, therefore, misleading in certain 
major respects and must be supplemented. There is no issue as to 
any material fact. (Solar's Br., p. 4.) 
First and foremost, Solar's business activities, concerned in this 
lawsuit, relate to the Great Salt Lake and involve the withdrawal of 
water from the Lake for the purpose of extracting salt (sodium 
chloride) therefrom. (R. 30-48). Solar's right to extract salt from the 
Great Salt Lake derives from a Royalty Agreement entered into with 
the State of Utah as of May 20, 1955.2 (R. 17-20, 25, 26, 33-37.) 
Solar complains of damage to its salt extraction operations due to 
diminution of salt content and higher Lake elevation, allegedly caused 
by Southern Pacific's causeway (R. 4) and contends that Southern 
Pacific should be held liable for such damages under various legal 
theories. (R. 5, 6.) 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
The controlling issue involved in this appeal is whether or not 
Judge Hanson, Sr., was correct in ruling, in effect, that Solar had no 
right to salt contained in the water of the Lake upon which to base 
its action for damages and injunctive relief against Southern Pacific. 
2Solar's omission of these fundamental facts is commented upon, infra, pp. 6-8. 
2 
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. \ M 
P O I N T J 
S< )J A B , AS A NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, HAS NO COMPENSABLE CLAIM 
AGAINST SOUTHERN PACIFIC. 
A ; l i s tory of ; •;. i M i.^ai '.m 
The foregoing portion of this brief relates only a small part of 
the history of this case as it fits into a larger history of Great Salt 
Lake cases involving several litigants. 
The first case wa- br-MiiJn by Mort-n International Inc., in ilie 
TIM-.I District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, ..u NKober 27, 1970.3 
L. h". iike Solar, asserted rights to take sail from \\n- Great Salt 
Lake based upwn a t-t-nniu royalty agreement which Morton had en-
tered inlu witii id. s;ni< *.\ 1 all, M( »rton contended, like Solar, that 
Southern Pacific's causeway was causing dilution of brines in 
lih- -M;;!: .am of the Great Salt Lake, resulting in damages to Morton. 
Muiton also sought an injunction to require modification of the 
causeway. 
The District Court's summary judgment dismissing Morton's 
complaint was affinm-d unanimously by this Court and that decision4 
establishes1 the coin milium ,-ind guiding precedent for the subsequently 
filed cases. In arriving at its decision in M- Morton case, this Court 
was offered assistance by both Solar ;:;- : Hardy Salt Company, as 
friend- =•! t:"- Court, so tliat the ( •our: \\i»i;!u appreciate the scope of 
n> ,'i'i .-:.-*i wiul also be apprised of all wl the legal theories that Morton 
3Other cases were filed by Sanders Brine Shrimp Company and Hardy Salt Company in 
November and December, 1970, respectively, and the present case, the last one, was filed Decem-
ber 31, 1970. 
^Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, 27 U.2d 256, 
495 P.2d 31 (1972), cert, denied. 409 U.S. 934 (1972). 
3 
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might be entitled to recover under, whether or not Morton previously 
had explicitly asserted all of such theories.5 
With the position and theories of the three complaining salt com-
panies thus expressed to it, this Court held that: 
(Morton's) right to divert and precipitate the salt is a non-
exclusive right, and that no matter what you call it . . . the 
right is circumscribed by the provisions of Title 65-1-15, U.C.A. 
1953, reserving to the State the salt in the water, to be sold 
by the state land board only upon a royalty basis6. . . . 
And that notwithstanding conceded damage to Morton, 
[T]here is no compensable claim here because (Morton) has 
no exclusive right against the State or others to the salt or the 
water from which it is recovered. . . . 27 IT.2d at 259. 
Southern Pacific submits that the foregoing, clearcut ruling by 
this Court is applicable directly to Solar's claim in this action for 
damage to its salt extraction business and demonstrates the propriety 
of the District Court's judgment of dismissal.7 Courts to which the 
other Great Salt Lake cases were submitted agree. 
The cases brought by Hardy and Sanders8 were consolidated for 
trial before Judge Willis W. Bitter. Further, those two cases were 
joined at the request of Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., successor to 
Morton, by a third case which Morton-Norwich filed in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, after this Court's 
decision in the original Morton case.9 
Hbid., 27 U.2d 256, 259, 260. 
(iThe royalty agreement from which Morton's rights stemmed is the same form of royalty 
agreement underlying Solar's rights. 27 U.2d 259, 260 (R. 33-37.) 
7Solar's attempt to extricate itself from the commonality of basic position that it shares with 
Morton and Hardy is discussed below. 
8n.3, supra. 
9This attempted second-bite at the apple by Morton was based upon alleged violations of the 
federal Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. 33 U.S.C. §401. 
4 
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These three cases were tried on a single record wiiil ;iu* plain-
tiffs relying to an extent upon the evidence offered by cacii other. 
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, Southern Pacific moved the Court 
to dismiss all three complaints. After argument from all *»f the parties 
was heard, the rnur t granted Mir molifMi. Tlif '*<>un (*um<hi(l'>d that 
the decision <:!" :hi- i'mirt in Morton, supra, was applicable and ^nn 
trollimr, r.u-1 i!-i; . ^ . * i • - - the decision :^ /•>/<' • Tonkins,10 the Court 
was I)u!i!;ii b> !^i<* decision <>l' )!ii> r .^ir i . Tin1 Court also ruled that 
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, supra, did not apply to the Great 
Salt Lake since it was a navigable body of water of the State of IJath, 
not ci navigable body nf \\<iirr of the United States. That decision 
was appealed to the I'liii^! States Court of Appeals for the 'IVniii 
Circuit, and affirmed unanimously.11 
Before the Tenth Circuit, Hardy Salt Company repeated various 
legal theories argiu ; \r, Judge Ritter as premises for distinguishing 
Hit ;;4.:,iti o'i \{* position from., that of Morton, in an attempt to allude 
iiii controlling, precedential effect ui this COUJ-CS decision in the 
Morton case. The theories thus argued by Hardy included all of the 
theories asserted by Solar in this appeal1- and prevn-nsh raised before 
this Court in a ; .•- '•;• i - nmiueu uy i i a u u .tnd ISolar in Uie 
Morton case.18 The LiM-uit '* i.irt considered all of those theories — 
nuisance, waste, pollution ;md >>>1erferenee with business interests — 
and rejected tlu-n !'•<«• r.?;ir: held that they provided no basis for 
distinguishing urn* •.<' «*»--:;|.-,:iv,s position from ' ,*-' **>' another, 
namely Morton.14 
10Erie Railroad Company v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
11
 Hardy Salt Company v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, 501 F.2d 1136 (10th 
Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974). 
12Hardy Brief to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, pp. 28-38. (Appendix A.) 
13Brief of Solar Salt Company, Amicus Curiae, pp. 1-5, 8-10; Brief of Hardy Salt Company, 
Amicus Curiae, pp. 9-11, 18-24. (Appendix B.) 
"501 F.2d 1161-65. 
5 
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Eeading through form to substance, the Court reasoned: 
The interference with business interests was the precise injury 
that Morton complained of in its State Court suit. And the 
rejection of such claims of interference with Morton's business 
was based upon the principle that only a nonexclusive right 
to extract salt existed under the royalty agreement and §65-1-15 
of the Utah statutes providing for royalty agreements and the 
taking of salt. We must agree that Hardy'}s rights can rise no 
higher since they come from the same basic source as those of 
Morton, (Emphasis added.) 501 F.2d 1163-64. 
B. Solar's Present Position. 
As indicated above, Solar's Great Salt Lake complaint was the 
last of a series of complaints to be filed. The Solar case remained 
dormant, more or less, as the Morton case progressed to a final deter-
mination. Shortly after the Morton decision, Southern Pacific moved 
the District Court to enter a Summary Judgment, dismissing Solar 's 
Complaint under the controlling precedent of this Court's decision in 
Morton, (R. 49-76.) Solar made no response to the motion at that time, 
and the case became dormant again while the Hardy, Sanders and 
Morton-Norwich cases were litigated actively.15 Following the final 
determination of those cases, as described above, Southern Pacific 
supplemented the legal authorities in support of its motion;10 Solar 
responded17 and the judgment now appealed from was entered. 
Taking a somewhat confusing, and perhaps extreme position, 
Solar apparently now is seeking reversal of the District Court's judg-
ment upon the premise that the prior decisions in the Morton and 
Hardy cases are not controlling, persuasive precedents as to it.18 
15Solar's counsel also represented Sanders Brine Shrimp Company in these three cases which 
were consolidated for trial and appeal. 
i6 (R. 77-84.) 
^ (R . 87-97.) 
18Solar Brief, Points I and II. Points III through V of Solar's Brief also fall within its basic 
arguments stated in Points I and II. 
6 
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The extreme position and length to which Solar extends itself in 
the attempt to establish a unique position as an extractor of salt from 
the Great Salt Lake is underscored in its statement of its position 
before this Court that : 
Solar, in this action, does not rely on contractual rights except 
to establish the value of its enterprise.19 
This statement, of course, is a direct contradiction of Solar's 
sworn answers to interrogatories wherein Solar identified its Royalty 
Agreement and Lease Agreement with the State of Utah as a source 
of right underlying its complaint.20 More important, however, is the 
conclusive legal impact which this statement has upon Solar's stand-
ing to maintain this action. The only right which Solar can have with 
regard to the salt in the Great Salt Lake must be obtained by contract 
with the State — its Eoyalty Agreement with the State. As this Court 
reasoned in Morton: 
' [T]he state as the owner of the beds of navigable bodies of 
water is entitled to all valuable minerals in or on them' . . . . 
(Morton's) right to divert and precipitate the salt is a non-
exclusive right, and that no matter what you call it . . . the 
right is circumscribed by the provisions of Title 65-1-15, U.C.A. 
1953, reserving to the State, the salt in the water, to 'be sold 
by the state land board only upon a royalty basis.' 27 U.2d 
258, 259. 
Solar's abandonment of even the contractual right that it had to 
purchase the salt under its royalty agreement with the State, only 
adds further grounds in support of the validity and accuracy of the 
District Court's judgment of dismissal. 
19Solar Brief, p. 5. 
20(R. 24, 25, 30-37.) The contention in Solar's brief, p. 2., that its Statement of Facts is 
not controverted by its Answers to Interrogatories does not apply to its asserted legal standing 
to maintain the Complaint herein. In the latter posture, it attempts to use shifting sand in place 
of bed rock that it does not have for a foundation. 
7 
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POINT II . 
SOLAR'S F U R T H E R ARGUMENTS ARE UNGUIDED 
AND IRRELEVANT. 
Solar's arguments concerning the non-applicability of the Morton 
and Hardy decisions to its theoretical assertions are answered largely 
in the foregoing sections of this brief. However, some limited re-
sponse to certain abstract, observation-comments by Solar may be 
appropriate. 
In Solar's Statement of Facts,21 recitation is made of its involve-
ment in the salt extraction industry on the Great Salt Lake and the 
damage to its business in that regard. Solar then poses the issue to 
be resolved by this Court as " whether the law of Utah affords any 
relief to Solar in the fact situation stated." (Solar Br., p. 4.) South-
ern Pacific submits that that question is answered fully, and nega-
tively, in the foregoing sections of this brief, insofar as Solar's facts 
and business are concerned. Solar, however, apparently would have 
the Court theorize on hypothetical situations not before it. Conceding 
that its own position provides no standing to sue, Solar conjectures: 
Dilution alone may not give rise to a cause of action, but it is 
a different matter to so change the lake that acquatic life is 
destroyed, recreational values are lost, and industrial water 
uses are impaired. (Solar Br., p. 7) 
The record is devoid of any suggestion that Solar is involved with 
aquatic life in the Lake or recreational use of the Lake, and its case 
does not rest on marine biology or recreation. Solar's involvement 
with industrial use of the Lake to the extent that it extracts salt 
therefrom, is its case, and on that basis, Southern Pacific submits that 
the District Court properly dismissed Solar's complaint herein. 
21Solar Br., pp. 2-4. 
8 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the 
judgment below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Haldor T. Benson 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent. 
9 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 73-1714, 73-1715, 73-1716 
HARDY SALT COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellee, 
GREAT SALT LAKE MINERALS 
& CHEMICALS CORPORATION, 
Intervener Defendant. 
* * * * 
SANDERS SHRIMP COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
* * * * 
MORTON-NORWICH PRODUCTS, INC. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of Utah, Central Division 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
HARDY SALT COMPANY 
Of Counsel: J. THOMAS GREENE 
F. WILLIAM McCALPIN GIFFORD W. PRICE 
Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen GREENE and NEBEKER 
and Chubb Attorneys for Appellant 
611 Olive Street 400 Kennecott Building 
St. Louis, Missouri 63101 Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Al 
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[28] 
Amendment is the preservation of his substantial 
right to redress by some effective procedure." 
Gibbs v. Zimmerman, 290 U. S. 326, 332 (1933). 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S 
CLAIMS BECAUSE IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SPE-
CIFIC WATER AND MINERAL RIGHTS GRANTED 
BY THE STATE OF UTAH, APPELLANT MAY OB-
TAIN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF OR DAMAGES FOR IN-
JURY TO ITS BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC INTER-
ESTS CAUSED BY ACTS OF THE APPELLEE. 
A. Negligence and/or Other Tortious Acts in Viola-
tion of Law. 
It is submitted that the Southern Pacific has no right 
or privilege to interfere with Hardy's economic and bus-
iness interests. Hardy is entitled to have such economic 
and business interests protected against unreasonable or 
tortious interference by the Southern Pacific even if, 
arguendo, Hardy's rights are termed merely a non-exclusive 
"privilege" or "license." The aforesaid Morton decision 
certainly does not reach this issue. 
For purposes of this argument, the facts as presented 
at trial by Hardy Salt must be accepted as true. Among 
other things, it must be accepted that the Southern Pacific 
knew that its total earth fill causeway likely would ad-
versely affect the Great Salt Lake, so as to cause chemical 
changes and the transportation of salt from south to north 
of the fill. Also, it must be accepted that expenses for opera-
tion of Hardy's business are being seriously increased be-
A2 
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[29] 
cause of the action of the Southern Pacific in constructing 
and maintaining a fill causeway. In essence, facts were pre-
sented at trial to the effect that the fill causeway unreason-
ably interferes with the use and enjoyment by Hardy Salt 
of its facilities and property, thereby causing harm to eco-
nomic interests and business of Hardy unreasonably and 
without justification. 
Undue interference with legitimate economic and busi-
ness interests of others is actionable. Prosser, Handbook 
on the Law of Torts, page 974. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized this principle in 
Reese v. Qualtrough, 48 Utah 23, 156 Pac. 956 (1916): 
" I t is not necessary to multiply illustrations, 
wrhich might well be done. When one interferes 
with my grocery, livery, or fish business he inter-
feres with my property; and when he destroys my 
business he destroys my property." (156 Pac. at 
959, emphasis added.) 
The case of Maddox v. International Paper Co., et al., 
47 F . Supp. 829, 105 F . Supp. 89, 203 F . 2d 88 (5th Cir. 
1942) bears a relationship to the situation at bar. In that 
case plaintiff brought an action for damages to its business, 
which had been established on a bayou in 1923. Plaintiff's 
business consisted of " . . . renting boats, catching and selling 
commercial fish, renting camp houses, serving fish dinners. 
In short, (plaintiff) maintained and operated an up-to-date 
and clean commercial fishing camp and prospered in the 
business." (47 F . Supp. at 830.) The Court noted that in 
1938, a predecessor of International Paper Co. erected a 
large pulp and paper mill " a t a cost in excess of twelve 
A3 
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[30] 
million dollars." In the course of operations, International 
Paper Co. dumped great amounts of waste water containing 
refuse into the river on which the plaintiff was relying for 
his business. The waste water which was being dumped 
into the river brought about a polluted situation causing 
death of fish and discoloration of the water. Plaintiff sued 
the defendant asserting that the act of one man which 
causes injury to another is compensable. The court held 
for plaintiff, and stated: 
Though we see no need of persuasive author-
ity, as the Louisiana decisions are quite to the 
point, we find that action for damages to one's bus-
iness caused by the pollution of a stream has been 
recognized by courts of other jurisdictions, . . . 
# # # 
The proof in this case is very consistent on 
the point that the plaintiff had a thriving prosper-
ous business before the pollution of the stream, 
and after the pollution of the stream he had no 
business left and his manner of making a living 
was taken from him; therefore, the only question 
remaining in the case is the amount of damage to 
which the plaintiff is entitled. (47 F. Supp. 829, 
831.) 
In this case there was no discussion of water rights or 
fishing rights per se. Also, there was no emphasis upon 
public ownership of the fish. The Court's concern was that 
a business which had been developed over the years and 
which had thrived was being unreasonably interfered with 
by another business which has no license or right to so in-
terfere. Since this interference caused economic hardship 
and interference with economic interest, it was held to be 
actionable, and the plaintiff was allowed the relief sought. 
A4 
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[31] 
Another case which demonstrates this point is Bay 
State Lobster Company, Inc. v. Perini Corp., 355 Mass. 794, 
245 N. E. 2d 759 (1969). Plaintiff had a lobster business 
wherein he relied on the water in a bay being of a certain 
nature and quality. Defendant was involved in dredging op-
erations and had secured permission to undertake such. The 
dredging operations interfered with plaintiff's business by 
adversely disturbing and affecting the bay waters. The 
court held for plaintiff, declaring that: "A license does not 
constitute a defense to an action for negligence." (245 
N. E. at 760.) Accord: West Muncie Strawhoard Company 
v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 N. E. 878 (1904); Tutwiler Coal 
Company v. Nicols, 145 Ala. 666, 39 So. 762 (1905); Hodges 
v. Pine Products Company, 135 Ga. 134, 68 S. E. 1107 
(1910); Carson v. Hercules Powder Company, 240 Ala, 887, 
402 S.W. 2d 640 (1966). 
B. Public Nuisance — Pollution and Obstruction in 
Violation of Law. 
The Southern Pacific has no right or privilege to 
alter the Great Salt Lake so as to cause injury resulting 
therefrom. It is submitted that the chemical alterations 
being caused by the Southern Pacific causeway, including 
dilution of the brines, violates the Utah anti-pollution stat-
ute and such violation is actionable by Hardy Salt Com-
pany. Also, the damming effect of the causeway violates 
Utah's anti-obstruction statute and is likewise actionable. 
The Utah Code provides: 
Pollution means such contamination, or other al-
teration of the physical, chemical or biological 
properties, of any waters of the state or such dis-
A5 
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[32] 
charge of any liquid, gaseous or solid substance in-
to any waters of the state as will create a nuisance 
or render such waters harmful or detrimental or 
injurious to public health, safety or welfare, or to 
domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, rec-
reational, or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to 
livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other aquatic 
life. Section 73-14-2(a), U.C.A. (Emphasis added.) 
It shall be unlaw fid for any person to cause pollu-
tion as defined in Section 73-14-2(a) of any waters
 ; 
of the state or to place or cause to be placed any 
waste in location where they will cause pollution 
of any waters of the state. Any such action is 
hereby declared to be a public nuisance. Section 
73-14-5, U.C.A. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah statutory law also denominates obstructions as a pub-
lic nuisance: 
A public nuisance is a crime against the order 
and economy of the state, and consists in unlaw-
fully doing any act, or omitting to perform any 
duty, which act or omission either: 
* # # 
(3) Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or -.':\ 
tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous for pas-
sage, any lake, stream, canal or basin, or any public 
park, square, street or highway. (Emphasis ad-
ded.) (Section 76-43-3, U.C.A.) 
Southern Pacific is polluting the Great Salt Lake as 
defined by statute, and Hardy is suffering great damage 
as a proximate result thereof. Southern Pacific has no li-
cense, privilege, right or otherwise to do so. These issues 
were not raised in pleadings of Morton Salt in the hereto-
fore referred to state court case, were not discussed in the 
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Briefs, and were not argued before the Utah Supreme Court 
in the said Morton decision. 
Hardy Salt has suffered special harm by reason of 
Southern Pacific's "nuisance," including violation of the 
aforesaid statutes. Protection afforded plaintiff is akin to 
that set forth in a well-reasoned line of cases throughout 
the country concerning fish and fishing businesses. 
In the case of Columbia River Fishermen's Protective 
Union v. City of St. Helens, 160 Ore. 654, 87 P. 2d 195, 
(1939), plaintiffs filed suit to restrain defendants from pol-
luting certain rivers. Oregon statutory law prohibited the 
pollution of streams and public rivers of the state causing 
destruction of fish life. The Oregon court recognized that 
ownership of the fish before being taken was in the State 
of Oregon, pointing out that the suit was not brought for 
the purpose of obtaining the fish, but to protect the right 
of fishermen to pursue their vocation of fishing. Plaintiffs, 
having a special interest to protect, were granted standing 
to sue, the court stating: 
To delete the fish from the Columbia and Willam-
ette Eivers is to prevent the plaintiffs from pur-
suing their vocations and earning their livelihood 
fishing with gill nets in the portions of the river 
where they have been accustomed to fish. (87 P. 
2d at 197, emphasis added.) 
# # * 
There is a vital distinction between the rights of 
plaintiffs, who are accustomed to fishing in the 
river and have a license to do so, and the rights of 
other citizens of the state, who never fish in the 
river and do not intend to and are interested only 
in a general way in the benefit the state receives 
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by the prosecution of a valuable industry . . . (87 P. 
2d at 197, emphasis added.) 
(By analogy, Hardy Salt in the instant action is in the 
position of plaintiffs, with a special interest to protect 
based in part upon an unquestioned state granted right to 
extract salt, as compared with the rights of other citizens 
who might complain about the alteration and "pollution" 
of the Great Salt Lake as constituting a public nuisance.) 
In Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N. C. 535, 
27 S. E. 2d 538 (1943), the court adopted a similar posture. 
An action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages 
for injury to his business and fishery on the Roanoke River, 
alleging that defendant was liable for the improper act of 
discharging noxious or deleterious substances from its pulp 
plant into the river, thus causing "pollution." Plaintiff 
owned certain lands adjacent to the waters of the river, as 
does Hardy to the Lake, and for more than 25 years was 
involved in the business of commercially taking and dis-
tributing fish. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint was 
that pollution caused by defendant's dumping was " . . . in-
imical to the fish inhabiting said waters, to such an extent 
and in such volume and quantity as to interfere with the 
free and long established passage, migration and habit of 
said fish from the ocean on their way to the spawning 
grounds in the upper reaches of the Roanoke River, and 
past the properties of the plaintiff, thus to a large extent 
destroying the fish and diverting said migratory pilgrim-
age, so as to seriously damage the business of the plaintiff 
and the profit from the use of his premises." (27 S. E. 2d 
at 539, emphasis added.) 
A8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
[35] 
Holding that plaintiff had standing to sue, the court 
stated: 
The law will not permit a substantial injury to the 
person or property of another by a nuisance, though 
public and indictable, to go without individual re-
dress, whether the right of action be referred to the 
existence of a special damage, or to an invasion of 
a more particular and more important personal 
right. The personal right involved here is the se-
curity of an established business. (27 S. E. 2d at 
545, emphasis added.) 
Accord: Carson v. Hercules Powder Co., 240 Ark. 
887, 402 S. W. 2d 640 (1966); J. H. Miles & Co., 
v. McLean Contracting Co., 180 F . 2d 789 (4th 
Cir.1950). 
The position of Hardy Salt is similar to that of the 
plaintiffs in the aforesaid cases. Hardy Salt acquired lands 
adjacent to the Great Salt Lake and in reliance thereon 
Hardy Salt and its predecessors have built and maintained 
a salt business for years. The location of Hardy 's land and 
business is crucial not only from the standpoint of the op-
eration of precipitating salt per se, but the ready availabil-
ity of different forms of transportation and the accessi-
bility to markets. Hardy 's rights pre-date construction of 
the causeway and the granting of an "easement" to the 
Southern Pacific with respect thereto. Most decidedly, 
Southern Pacific's position is distinguishable from that of 
other salt operations. Other salt companies have a right 
to precipitate and take salt; Southern Pacific does not. 
A public nuisance also exists under Utah statutory law 
where an unlawful obstruction has been created on a public 
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lake. The dam-like effect of the causeway is such an un-
lawful obstruction, and as such also constitutes a public 
nuisance in violation of Utah's anti-obstruction statute. 
C. Private Nuisance. 
The Utah Code provides: 
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent, 
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the 
free use of property, so as to interfere with the 
comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nui-
sance and the subject of an action. Such action 
may be brought by any person whose property is 
injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment 
is lessened by nuisance; and by the judgment the 
nuisance may be enjoined or (abated), and dam-
ages may also be recovered. (U.C.A. 1953 78-38-1 
— Emphasis added.) 
Appellant's business and economic interests and use 
of real property are entitled to protection under this stat-
ute. Hardy's property and rights are "injuriously af-
fected" by the Southern Pacific causeway. The Morton 
decision does not refer to private nuisance in general, nor 
the aforesaid statutory nuisance specifically. 
D. Waste. 
By construction of its fill causeway the Southern Pa-
cific has created a phenomena which is causing the waste 
and drainage of a valuable resource. Assuming as true the 
factual evidence presented at trial by Hardy, millions of 
tons of salt are being carried to the north end of the lake 
and being precipitated there in such a way that recovery of 
this resource is difficult or impossible. In any event, sodium 
chloride is being "wasted" as to Hardy and other salt ex-
A10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
tractors dependent upon brine waters south of the cause-
way. 
Waste has been defined as " the violation of an obliga-
tion to treat the premises in such a manner that no harm 
be done to them and that the estate may revert to those 
having an underlying interest undeteriorated by any tvillful 
or negligent act." (93 C.J.S. 560. Emphasis added.) As 
stated in Tiffany: 
Generally speaking, the person in possession 
is required, in the course of his utilization of the 
land, the making or causing physical changes 
thereon and therein, to do so in such a way as not 
unreasonably to injure one who has a right or pos-
sibility of future possession. A failure to comply 
with this requirement is what ordinarily consti-
tutes waste. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, / 
3rd Ed., Vol. I I , p. 629. 
It is submitted that Hardy Salt, by reason of its property 
rights set forth in its Royalty Agreement in combination 
with its water rights, and by reason of its economic interests 
otherwise, has a right to complain of waste. In addition, 
Hardy is well within the category of those who may com-
plain of waste under Utah statutory law: 
If a guardian, tenant for life or years, joint 
tenant or tenant in common of real property com-
mits waste thereon, any person aggrieved by the 
ivaste may bring an action against him therefor, 
in which action there may be a judgment for treble 
damages. 78-38-2 U.C.A. 1953. 
Unquestionably, Hardy is a person aggrieved and is 
entitled to maintain action for the waste of this valuable 
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resource which would not be so wasted "but for" the con-
struction of the fill causeway by the Southern Pacific 
Transportation Company. This issue of waste was not 
raised in the Morton case, the Southern Pacific objected 
to its consideration, and the Morton decision does not cover 
it. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
a corporation,
 m . . . , , A 77 . * ' Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, 
P ' Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF SOLAR SALT COMPANY, 
5 AMICUS CURIAE 
NATURE OF AMICUS CURIAE INTEREST 
Solar Salt Company, herein called "Solar" is en-
gaged in business enterprise of the same nature (al-
though on somewhat different legal foundations) as 
the enterprise the appellant seeks to protect by the in-
stant litigation. Solar has major investment in plant 
on the south shore of Great Salt Lake by which lake 
brines are transported from the lake and dehydrated 
for recovery of the sodium chloride content. Solar in 
part relies, for its rights to transport the waters and 
harvest the salt, upon contracts with and grants from 
the State of Utah including a "royalty agreement" 
which is of the same genre as the royalty agreement 
in evidence here. 
Case No. 
12557 
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Solar has the same concern as appellant about 
the respondent's having caused the migration of bil-
lions of tons of sodium chloride to that part of the lake 
north of the causeway and the waste of that salt by its 
deposit on the lake bed there. Solar has experienced 
increasing difficulty and expense in producing salt from 
the south lake brines as they become more and more 
dilute, and Solar has commenced suit to compel respond-
ent to provide a remedy. 
ISSUE OF CONCERN TO SOLAR 
The issue to which this brief is addressed is this: 
"Does an owner of land adjacent to Great Salt 
Lake who enters into a royalty agreement with 
the State of the kind here in evidence and who, 
in reliance on that agreement, makes capital 
investments and develops a profitable business 
enterprise have standing to sue a third party 
who drains and wastes the resource to which the 
agreement relates ?" 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RIGHTS GRANTED BY THE ROYALTY 
AGREEMENT ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT AN 
ACTION FOR WASTE, AND THE COMPLAINT 
STATES SUCH ACTION 
Respondent, throughout its oral and written argu-
ments, has adopted the concept that the dissolved 
salts and suspended solids in Great Salt Lake brines 
are a part of the really. According to respondent, own-
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ership of the resource which concerns us here is en-
tailed in ownership of the lakebed. At page 6 of its 
brief, respondent says: ^ 
i
' That the State of Utah owns the salt and other 
minerals contained in the water of the lake is 
unquestionable. Under the established consti-
tutional principle of equality of the states, title 
to the beds of all streams and lakes which were 
navigable at the time of Utah's statehood passed 
to the State." 
Accepting this analysis, arguendo, we submit 
that the complaint herein effectively states a cause of 
action for waste. The complaint alleges that respond-
ent, legally occupying Great Salt Lake bed for cause-
way construction and operation purposes, has so 
constructed and operated that facility as to cause the 
lake's sodium chloride to migrate to the north of the 
causeway, precipitate on the north bed in quantities 
conservatively measured in millions of tons and thereby 
be lost as an economically recoverable resource. The 
analogy to the standard textbook illustration of waste 
(where a tenant with less than a fee simple interest 
destroys the timber on the land) could scarcely be 
clearer. Waste is "the violation of an obligation to treat 
the premises in such a manner that no harm be done 
to them and that the estate may revert to those having 
an underlying interest undeteriorated by any willful 
or negligent act." (93 CJS 560) 
Tiffany (The Law of Real Property, Third Edition, 
Volume 2, page 629) analyses the tort of waste as 
follows: 
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"generally speaking, the person in possession 
is required, in the course of his utilization of 
the land, and in making or causing physical 
changes thereon and therein, to do so in such a 
way as not unreasonably to injure one who has 
a right or possibility of future possession. A 
failure to comply with this requirement is what 
ordinarily constitutes waste. Waste has been 
defined a s " "an unreasonable or improper, 
use, abuse, mismanagement, or omission of 
duty touching real estate by one rightfully in 
possession, which results in its substantial in-
jury." " 
It is noteworthy that one kind of right to which the 
law, according to Tiffany, affords protection is a "pos-
sibility of future possession," and appellant has, under 
the least favorable interpretation of its royalty agree-
ment, a possibility of possessing sodium chloride, a 
part of the reality. The term "possibility of future 
possession" is, of course, subject to interpretation, and 
the courts, when left to their own devices, have seldom 
if ever found anything less than a classic future interest 
to qualify. Utah courts are not, however, left to their 
own devices. There is a specific statutory pronounce-
ment on the subject. Section 78-38-2, UCA 1953, as 
amended, reads as follows: 
"If a guardian, tenant for life or years, joint ten-
ant or tenant in common of real property com-
mits waste thereon, any person aggrieved by the 
waste may bring an action against him therefor, 
in which action there may be a judgment for 
treble damages." 
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The statute does not require that the interest of the 
"person aggrieved" fall in any category of real prop-
erty estates. We believe this court will be fully briefed 
as to the nature of the estate appellant may properly 
claim under the royalty agreement alone or as supple-
mented by water rights appellant has established by 
appropriation or riparian ownership. Whatever deter-
mination on the point this court may make, it can hardly 
be contended that the removal and waste of the resource 
which the salt companies have spent millions to get into 
position to recover is not a true source of aggrievement 
to them. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE CONDUCT OF EESPONDENT DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE THE COMMISSION OF WASTE, 
APPELLANT HAS STATUS TO SUE FOE RE-
SPONDENT'S UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE 
WITH AN ECONOMIC INTEREST. 
The allegations of the complaint herein are (and 
they must be taken to be true) that appellant has made 
heavy investment in plant and personnel to realize the 
advantages of an agreement with the State of Utah 
and rights otherwise acquired to recover sodium chloride 
from Great Salt Lake brines. Appellant has in fact 
profitably engaged in a salt extraction business since 
before Utah's statehood. Respondent has acted to cause 
a high percentage of the salt (which would otherwise 
have been contained in the brines at appellant's point 
of intake) to migrate away from appellant's plant and 
to be lost to appellant. 
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Maddox v. Internatioanl Paper Company, 41 F. Supp. 
829, 105 F. Supp. 89, 203 F. 2nd 88; West Muncie 
Strawboard Company v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 NE 879; 
Tutwiler Coal Company v. Nichols, 145 Ala. 666, 39 
So. 762; Hodges v. Pine Product Company, 135 Ga. 
134; Bay State Lobster Co., Inc., vs. Perini Corp., 245 
NE 2d 759; Carson v. Hercules Powder Company, 402 
SW 2nd 640 (Arkansas, 1966); J. H. Miles & Company 
v. McLean Contracting Co., 180 F 2nd 789 (4th Circuit, 
Virginia, 1950). 
In none of these cases was it contended that the 
plaintiff owned the fish in the water or enjoyed a more 
formidable estate in the watercourse than a mere li-
cense. The "property" protected was an economic 
interest, a reasonable expectancy of profit from the 
utilization of a natural resource if it were left in its 
natural state. The defendant in each case interferred 
with the natural condition of the waters, and the plain-
tiff recovered for loss of profit. 
POINT III 
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY PRESENT OR 
FUTURE INTEREST OR ESTATE APPELLANT 
MAY HAVE IN THE LAND (I.E. THE LAKE BED 
AND THE SALTS DISSOLVED OR SUSPENDED IN 
THE LAKE WATERS) RESPONDENT HAS A 
DUTY TO UTILIZE LAKE RED IN ITS POSSES-
SION SO AS NOT TO INJURE NEIGHBORING 
LANDS INCLUDING APPELLANT'S. 
The complaint herein alleges that respondent 
has utilized lake bed land in such a way as to injure 
appellant's land neighboring the lake. The injury is in-
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herent in the facts that (1) the lake waters no longer 
circulate in their natural fashion and are held at an 
artificially high level on or near appellant's land and 
(2) the waters are changed from their natural quality. 
This court needs no introduction to the concept 
that there are restrictions upon one's mode of utilizing 
land in his possession which exist in favor of occupants 
of neighboring land. We would refer the court, however, 
to the discussion beginning at page 98, Tiffany, Real 
Property, Third Edition, Volume 3. 
Many of the cases which established the concept 
involved offensive noise or odor. By far the most num-
erous, however, are the cases which involve a defendant's 
interference with water or water courses as they flow 
through his land, so that the plaintiff, a riparian owner, 
finds the water to which his land is adjacent to be dimin-
ished in quantity or quality for his purposes. In those 
jurisdictions where riparian rights are fully recognized, 
there can be no question as to the actionable character 
of such conduct. The cases are collected in the West 
Digest System, Key 64 et seq., water and water courses. 
The issue of consequence here is not whether con-
duct of the kind complained of is actionable where 
riparian doctrine is judicially adopted, but whether a 
riparian landowner, under the water law of Utah, has 
any right to complain because the water course his land 
adjoins has been changed so as to impart less value to 
the riparian land. 
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It is certainly true that riparian land ownership 
entails less interest in the adjacent water under Utah 
law than under the common law. In essence, the Utah 
courts and legislature have adopted the concept that 
beneficial use is the basis, the measure and the limit 
of all rights to water. Any common lawT doctrine which 
is inconsistent with that concept is not recognized. The 
seminal case on the subject is Stowell v. Johnson, 7 U 
215, 26 Pac. 260. 
This does not necessarily mean that all common law 
doctrine related to lakes, streams and water courses 
has been rejected. Utah cases still talk about reliction 
and accretion, and Utah claims to own the beds of 
navigable lakes and streams on a common law7 sover-
eignty theory. On occasion, Utah cases have recognized 
that riparian principles can have application where the 
appropriation and riparian concepts are not at war. 
In Whitmore v. Salt Lake City, 89 U. 387, the court 
referred to a repudiation of riparian rights " i n the 
main." In Kano v. Arcon Corporation, 7 U 2d 431, 
the defendant upstream user was required to deposit 
the water appropriated by the plaintiff downstream user 
in the natural channel at the boundary of plaintiff's 
land. The court there talked about " the easement one 
has in a natural stream leading to his property convey-
ing appropriated water ." 
The message of the Utah cases is that riparian 
owners will not be permitted to assert any rights by 
reason of riparian ownership which will in any way 
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the Royalty Agreement as postulated in the premise of 
the Southern Pacific argument, Morton has an exclusive 
quantitative properly interest in water, the property 
from which salt is "mined" or precipitated. The exclus-
ivity of interest is established by the State in combining 
the right to salt (Royalty Agreement) with appropriation 
of the water. With the union of its water rights and 
Royalty Agreement, Morton became entitled to a quan-
tum of water, i.e., the amount placed to beneficial use in 
order to extract salt as such is found in the natural state 
of the water. 
2. Morton is entitled to protection from interfer-
ence by the Southern Pacific with the natural 
quality of its water rights. 
Besides a right in priority and quantity, an appro-
priator of water is entitled to the water in its natural 
state, thus having a right in the constancy of quality as 
related to beneficial use of the water. Salt Lake City v. 
Boundary Springs Water Users Association, 2 Utah 2d 
141, 144, 290 P.2d 453 (1954), Crane v. Winsor, 2 Utah 
248, 253, (1878), Rocky Ford Irrigation Company, et al. 
v. Kents Lake Reservoir Company, et ah, 104 Utah 202, 
135 P.2d 108 (1943), The Utah Law of Water Rights, 
Wells A. Hutchins, Dallin W. Jensen, Oct. 1965, p. 45. 
Concern for such a vested right in the quality of 
water as related to its beneficial use is emphasized by 
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the Utah Supreme Court in the Rocky Ford Irrigation 
case, supra: ; i 
The power company is in somewhat the same 
position. It contends that it will suffer substantial 
damage to its equipment unless the proposed res-
; ervoir is so constructed that it will not empty 
silt and debris into the stream at times when the 
stream ivould otherwise he free from such foreign 
matter, i.e., during low water period. It does not 
appear what type of dam Kents Lake proposes to 
build. It may contemplate a type of construction 
which will filter the water or otherwise retain the 
debris. As pointed out by the California Supreme 
Court in Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P.2d 
702, 709, "an appropriator of waters of a stream, 
as against upper owners with inferior rights of 
user, is entitled to have the water at his point of 
diversion preserved in its natural state of purity, 
and amy use which corrupts the water so as to 
essentially impair its usefulness for the purposes 
to which he originally devoted it, is an invasion of 
his rights. Any material deterioration of the 
quality of the stream by subsequent appropriators 
or others without superior rights entitles him to 
both injunctive and legal relief." (135 P.2d at 114) 
(Emphasis added.) 
This case underscores the right of a senior appro-
priator to bring action against not only junior appro-
priators but others who have interfered with the quality 
of water rights. Quality of water means quality defined 
not by an abstract definition, but as quality relates to 
the beneficial use of the water for which an appropriation 
is made. 
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The right to have water in its natural state is empha-
sized further by the Utah Supreme Court in holding that 
an appropriator is entitled to have the water flow in a 
natural channel: 
An appropriator of the waters of a natural 
stream flowing through the public domain ac-
quires an easement over the lands through which 
the stream flows for the flow of the water to his 
point of diversion, as it was wont to flow when he 
first made the appropriation. This right is also 
acquired as against the subsequent purchasers of 
the lands from the United States and their gran-
tees. It therefore follows that an appropriator 
has the implied authority to do all that is neces-
sary to secure the enjoyment of such an easement. 
He therefore has the right to go upon the lands 
after they have become private and remove ob-
structions from the bed of the stream, so as to 
permit the water to continue its flow in its origi-
nal channel to the head of his ditch. Tripp v. Bag-
ley, et al, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912 (1928) (Citing 
2 Kinney on Irrigation (2d ed.) Section 991, p. 
1751.) (276 P. 912,919) 
The Southern Pacific is interfering with the natural 
circulation pattern of the Great Salt Lake and all the 
streams flowing into it by creating and maintaining a 
dam in the form of the causeway. This dam, in turn, 
is adversely affecting the quality of waters in several 
particulars, including dilution of the salt content within 
waters south of the causeway. 
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According to this finding (the construction 
most favorable to plaintiff of wThich is suscep-
tible) the railroad company granted nothing more 
than a license to the plaintiff to mine coal from 
the land, and did not grant plaintiff any property 
in the coal until it had mined it. As long as the 
coal remained in place, it was the property of the 
railroad company. . . . The plaintiff could not re-
cover damages on the theory that it had title to 
the coal. No doubt, as was said in Baker v. Hart, 
supra, the act of the defendants was an infringe-
ment of plaintiff's rights, for which it could re-
cover damages as it in fact sustained; but it 
proved none. (120 Pac, 715, 718) (Emphasis 
added.) 
While the two cases above quoted cannot be said to 
be directly applicable to the Great Salt Lake because of 
the unique nature of rights granted to salt extractors, 
they do demonstrate that the legal effect of rights grant-
ed, rather than nomenclature, is of paramount signifi-
cance. 
I t is submitted that Morton has property interests, 
whatever such interests might be "labelled" or "cate-
gorized, ' ' which are cognizable in law and are entitled to 
protection. 
POINT II . 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC HAS NO RIGHT OR 
PRIVILEGE TO I N T E R F E R E W I T H MORTON'S 
ECONOMIC INTERESTS. 
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As argued supra, Morton has property interests 
which are entitled to protection. Legal rights and reme-
dies to achieve such protection extend not just to the 
value of the property per se, but to all consequences 
stemming from interference with such property interests. 
It is submitted that even without demonstrating 
a property interest per se, Morton would be and is en-
titled to have its economic interests protected against 
unreasonable interference with said interests. Morton 
has developed an extensive business for the extraction 
of salt, and even if the carrying on of such business to 
precipitate is a mere "pr ivi lege" (which, as argued 
supra, it certainly is not), Morton is entitled to have its 
business interests protected. 
For purposes of the appeal, the facts as alleged by 
Morton must be accepted as true. In this regard, it is 
alleged that the effectiveness of the operations of Morton 
Salt is being seriously diminished and impaired because 
of the action of the Southern Pacific in constructing and 
maintaining a fill causeway. It is further alleged that 
the causeway unreasonably interferes with the use and 
enjoyment by Morton of its facilities, thereby increasing 
the costs of Morton's economic activity without justifica-
tion. 
Undue interference with legitimate economic inter-
ests of others is actionable, as in the expectations of 
profit therefrom: 
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Upon this foundation, a rather formidable 
body of law has been erected which in general has 
followed along the lines of interference with con-
tract. It has been said that u in a civilized com-
munity which recognizes the right of the private 
property among its institutions, the notion is in-
tolerable that a man should be protected by the 
law in the enjoyment of property once it is ac-
quired, but left unprotected by the law in his 
effort to acquire i t ; " and that since a large part 
of what is most valuable in modern life depends 
upon "probable expectancies," as social and in-
dustrial life becomes more complex the courts 
must do more to discover, define and protect them 
from undue interference. Prosser, Handbook on 
the Law of Torts, p. 974. 
The case of Maddox v. International Paper Co., et 
al, 47 F. Supp. 829, 105 F. Supp. 89, 203 F.2d 88 (1942) 
bears a relationship to the situation at bar. In that case 
plaintiff brought an action for damages to its business, 
which had been established on a bayou in 1923. The 
Court commented that "His business was renting boats, 
catching and selling commercial fish, renting camp 
houses, serving fish dinners. In short, he maintained and 
operated an up-to-date and clean commercial fishing 
camp and prospered in the business." (47 F. Supp. at 
830) In 1938, a predecessor to International Paper Co. 
erected a large pulp and paper mill "at a cost in excess 
of twelve million dollars." In the course of operations, 
International Paper Co. dumped great amounts of waste 
water containing refuse into the river on which the plain-
tiff was relying for his business. The waste water which 
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was being dumped into the river brought about a polluted 
situation causing death of fish and discoloration of the 
water. Plaintiff sued the defendant asserting that the 
act of one man which causes injury to another is com-
pensable. The court held for plaintiff, and stated: 
Though we see no need of persuasive author-
ity, as the Louisiana decisions are quite to the 
point, we find that action for damages to one's 
business caused by the pollution of a stream has 
been recognized by courts of other jurisdictions, 
The proof in this case is very consistent on 
the point that the plaintiff had a thriving prosper-
ous business before the pollution of the stream, 
and after the pollution of the stream he had no 
business left and his manner of making a living 
was taken from him; therefore, the only question 
remaining in the case is the amount of damage to 
which the plaintiff is entitled. (47 F . Supp. 829, 
831.) 
In this case there was no discussion of water rights 
or fishing rights per se. Also, there was no emphasis 
upon public ownership of the fish. The court's concern 
was that a business which had been developed over the 
years and which had thrived was being unreasonably in-
terfered with by another business which had no license 
or right to so interfere. Since this interference caused 
economic hardship and interference with economic in-
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terest, it was held to be actionable, and the plaintiff was 
allowed the relief sought. 
Another case which demonstrates this point is Bay 
State Lobster Company, Inc. v. Perini Corp., 245 N.E. 2d 
759. In that case, plaintiff had a lobster business wherein 
he relied on the water in a bay being of a certain nature 
and quality. Defendant was involved in dredging opera-
tions and had secured permission to undertake such. 
The dredging operations interfered with plaintiff's busi-
ness by adversely disturbing and affecting the bay 
waters. The court held for plaintiff, declaring that : " A 
license does not constitute a defense to an action for 
negligence." (245 N.E. at 760) Accord: West Muncie 
Strawboard Company v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 N.E. 878; 
Tutwiler Coal Company v. Nicols, 145 Ala. 666, 39 So. 
762; Hodges v. Pine Product Company, 135 Ga. 134; 
Carson v. Hercules Powder Company, 402 S.W. 2d 640 
(1966); J. H. Miles & Company v. McLean Contracting 
Co., 180 F.2d 789 (1950). 
The Southern Pacific has no license, lease, appro-
priation or other affirmative right with respect to the 
waters of the Great Salt Lake. It has no license, lease or 
other right with respect to the salt in the Great Salt Lake. 
The Southern Pacific has only an easement to construct 
and maintain a causeway. Its agreement with the State 
of Utah does not give the Southern Pacific license, per-
mission or otherwise negligently to construct a cause-
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way, to construct a causeway which causes a nuisance, 
or otherwise to impair the rights of others in the use 
and enjoyment of their property. The Southern Pacific 
certainly has no license or privilege to construct a cause-
way which interferes with the economic interest of those 
having prior rights. 
POINT I I I 
THE PRESENT FILL CAUSEWAY OF THE 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC IS CAUSING WASTE OF A 
VALUABLE RESOURCE. 
By construction of its fill causeway the Southern 
Pacific has created a phenomena which is causing the 
waste and drainage of a valuable resource. Assuming as 
true the factual allegations of Morton, millions of tons 
of salt are being carried to the north end of the lake and 
being precipitated there in such a way that recovery of 
this resource is difficult or impossible. In any event, 
sodium chloride is being "was t ed" as to Morton and 
other salt extractors dependent upon brine water south 
of the causeway. 
Waste has been defined as " the violation of an 
obligation to treat the premises in such a manner that no 
harm be done to them and that the estate may revert to 
those having an underlying interest undeteriorated by 
any willful or negligent act ." (93 C.J.S. 560) As stated in 
Tiffany: 
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Generally speaking, the person in possession 
is required, in the course of his utilization of the 
land, and making or causing physical changes 
thereon and therein, to do so in such a way as not 
unreasonably to injure one who has a right or 
possibility of future possession. A failure to com-
ply with this requirement is what ordinarily con-
stitutes waste. Tiffany, The Law of Real Prop-
erty, 3rd Ed., Vol. II , p. 629. 
I t is submitted that Morton Salt, by reason of its prop-
erty rights set forth in its Royalty Agreement in com-
bination with its water rights, and by reason of its eco-
nomic interests otherwise has a right to complain of 
waste. In addition, however, Morton has express statu-
tory standing to complain of such waste. The Utah 
legislature has broadened the category of those who may 
complain of waste: 
If a guardian, tenant for life or years, joint 
tenant or tenant in common of real property 
commits waste thereon, any person aggrieved by 
the waste may bring an action against him 
therefor, in which action there may be a judgment 
for treble damages. 78-38-2 U.C.A. 1953 (Empha-
sis added.) 
Unquestionably, Morton is a person aggrieved and is 
entitled to maintain action for the waste of this valuable 
resource which would not be so wasted "bu t fo r " the 
construction of the fill causeway by the Southern Pacific 
Transportation Company. 
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